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Notes
PERSONALITY TESTS FOR PROSPECTIVE JURORS
1. CoNcmmN ABouT TE JxmY SYSTEM
When we use the generic term "jury," it usually designates the
distinctive mode of trying issues of fact in civil and criminal cases in
countries where Anglo-American law prevails. While this institution
was long commonly believed to be the result of the Magna Carta of
1215, its basis has also been ascribed to a Scandinavian institution, to
Alfred the Great, and to a primitive mode of trial practiced in England
known as compurgation.1 In fact, the jury arose in the ancient inquisi-
tions of the Carolingian kings,2 dating from the ninth century, in
which groups of disinterested citizens were required to give informa-
tion under oath which was used to establish royal rights.3 This
Frankish institution was carried to the duchy of Normandy, and then
to England in 1066 after the Battle of Senlac Hill, but was not utilized
on a grand scale until about 1086. However, it was not until after the
reign of Henry II (1154-89) that this mode of trial was used for the
benefit of others than the crown. The bulk of criminal litigation, as
such, was still decided by the traditional Anglo-Saxon methods:
compurgation, wherein friends of the defendant exonerated him by
swearing that he was an honorable man; ordeals involving various
forms of torture to ascertain innocence; and the Norman method of
trial by battle.4 When Henry II ascended the throne, he brought
with him a form of inquisition in which a person's guilt or innocence
was determined by his neighbors. While the scope of the inquisition
was first limited to controversies affecting real property, in time the
inquisition was extended to other civil controversies.5
In 1166, Henry II took the preliminary steps to provide a jury
trial in criminal cases by requiring twelve men to be present at every
county court session to serve in much the same capacity as the
present-day grand jury, i.e., to identify parties who were suspected
1 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA B.TANNICA Jury 159 (1965).2 The Carolingians were a sovereign dynasty in western Europe. The name
is derived from the fact that a number of their members were called Charles (Lat.
Carolus; Ger. Karl); eight being so named between the beginning of the 8th and
the end of the 9th centuries-the most famous among them being Charlemagne.
3 1 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 135-69 (1922) [hcrein-
after cited as HOLDswoRTH].
4j. GOEBEL, DEVELOErmNT OF LEGAL INsTrruTmONS 56 (1946).
5 HoLDsWoRTH 298-350.
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of having committed serious crimes. Prior to 1215 and Pope Innocent
III's action of forbidding the participation of the priest in the ordeals,
the person, or persons, named by the twelve men was subjected im-
mediately to the ordeals, without the possibility of exoneration. Four
years later, in 1219, Henry III decreed that the judgment of the
neighbors, i.e., the peer group, should be substituted for the ordeals.
However, it was not until the mid-fourteenth century, under the leader-
ship of Edward III, that the grand jury was servered from the petit
or trial jury function.6
In contrast to our present day practice, the jurors of the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries, in both civil and criminal litigation, passed
judgment on the basis of what they personally knew. In fact, it was
not until the latter part of the seventeeth century that a jury's
verdict had to be based exclusively on evidence presented to the court,
rather than their personal insight and knowledge. While the verdicts
at first did not require unanimity, the English judges from the late
fourteenth century to the seventeenth century required unanimous
verdicts, even if the judge had to insure the verdict by placing the
jurors in jail. Furthermore, if the judge disagreed with the verdict,
until the early seventeenth century, the recourse was to empanel the
attaint jury to "try" the petit jury. The penalty for being adjudged of
having lied by the attaint jury, or of having given a false verdict, was
the forteiture of the petit juror's lands and goods to the king. While
such a verdict by the attaint jury would result in a new trial in civil
cases, the property-owner rules permitted a criminal verdict to stand,
even though the same sanctions were imposed on similarly adjudged
criminal jurors. It was soon realized that the attaint jury was reluctant
to impose such sanctions on their fellow property owners; thus, the
practice did not correspond to the procedure set forth in the statutes.
To fill this gap in the procedure, the trial judges of the early 1800's
began ordering new trials in civil cases where the judge believed the
jury had improperly rendered a judgment. This practice was not
followed in criminal litigation in England, but the early American
practice was to order new trials in both civil and criminal litigation.7
It should be apparent from a study of American history why the
American colonists adopted the practice of ordering new trials in both
types of litigation, as well as insisting that their new constiution con-
tain specific safeguards for the right to trial by jury. Since the drafting
of the Constitution, with the guarantee of the basic right of a trial by
jury, i.e., that a jury of twelve men should reach a unanimous decision
6id.
7 P. EDmuNDS, LAw AND CIViLIZATION 354-74 (1959).
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with the assistance of the trial judge's comments on the law and the
evidence, the state courts have altered the meaning of the concept of
"trial by jury" as to the number, the unanimity requirement, and the
judge's role in relation to the jury.8
Since the early 1900's, considerable attention has been directed to
the contemporary judicial structure, its divergence from the past, as
well as its present inadequacies. While part of the reproving may ap-
pear as little more than nostalgia for days past, an argument can be
made that certain aspects of the earlier structure were at least
idealistically better than our present system.9 The more critical dis-
sent, however, has been raised by legal scholars who challenge the
underlying premise of the judicial procedures. 10
Of those who have been vocal in their discontent, Judge Jerome
Frank must stand as the most outspoken leader. In his works, Judge
Frank implies that he would propose the elimination of the jury
system entirely." This proposal is based on an underlying bias, shared
by other scholars, that jurors are generally unable to perform a duty
which connotes omniscience.' 2 This critique is an echo of earlier
observations by various writers who observed that under particular
circumstances the same individual, e.g., a judge or juror, might decide
the same issue of fact in either of two ways.' 3 From these observations
and those which Judge Frank experienced, it is suggested that the
jury system is incapable of making rational determinations of the
facts and their legal implications.14 This theme has been amplified to
the point that one scholar has suggested that "experience teaches
that not every case is decided on the evidence. Prejudice may be a
thirteenth juror that controls the decision."'8 In tones of bitterness, it
has also been suggested that:
Too long has the effete and sterile jury system been permitted to tug
at the throat of the nation's judiciary as it sinks under the smothering de-
luge of the obloquy of those it was designed to serve. Too long has
ignorance been permitted to sit ensconced in the places of judicial ad-
ministration where knowledge is so sorely needed. Too long has the
lament of the Shakespearean character been echoed, "Justice has fled
to brutish beasts and men have lost their reason."'16
8 Lukowsky, The Constitutional Right of Litigants to Have the State Trial
Judge Comment Upon the Evidence, 55 Ky. L.J. 121 (1966).
9Id.
I'DA. OSBORN, THm Mum OF Tm JUROR 8, 15-16 (1937).
11 J. FnFANE COURTS ON TmAL ch. 8 & 9.
12 Id. at 118-19.
13 n COURTS ON TuRL&, Frank quotes Alexander Pope as having written,
"The hungry judge soon the sentence signs, and wretches hang that jurymeu may
dine." Id. at 162.
14 Id. at 118.
'5 A. OsBORN, supra note 10, at 92.
16 Sebille, Trial by Jury: An Inefficient. Surival, 10 A.B.AJ. 53, 55 (1924).
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Realizing the validity of criticisms of the structure, and thereby
recognizing the existence of a problem, a move was started which
culminated in a publication proposing the establishment of minimum
standards for jurors.17 While this proposal has merit, the standards
would still provide for a jury system which is believed by some to be
inherently ineffective."' To those who so believe, the reality which must
be faced is that of an alternative which would not only improve the
system, but which in turn would not create problems of a similar
magnitude, or at least which would not be subject to the same
criticisms, i.e., the general inability of human beings to judge their
fellow man. The controversy is probably little more than begun; those
who wish to continue the present system of jury selection with its
complications and shortcomings, and those who wish to alter limited
areas should be at least aware of the work which has been completed.
Although a complete bibliography does not appear to be in print, and
it is of course beyond the scope of this article to supply this material,
the controversy has elicited the considered opinions of individuals in
political science, philosophy, and law.'9
In light of the controversy which has been raging, one is indeed
puzzled by the amount of time consumed in even considering the
possibility of examining the jury, and attempting to discover exactly
what makes the jury decide as it does. Several years ago, a study was
begun at the University of Chicago to observe the operation of juries
in mock trials. The Chicago Jury Project, as it is commonly known, has
manipulated both the facts and the composition of juries to study the
effect of socio-economic factors on verdicts and decisions. At the same
time, the Project spent considerable time, energy, and finances in an
attempt to study the real world rather than the artificial findings of a
laboratory. This work was done by use of scientific sampling techni-
ques and questionnaires given to both judges and jurors. To date, two
volumes have been published which supply insight into the phe-
nomena of the jury trial.20 In the near future, a third volume should be
forthcoming which will examine the jury's handling of the defense of
insanity, and an experimental sequence to test the impact of varying
instructions on the law of insanity.2'
17 A. V DEBILT, Mnmnmm STA -DArms OF JuDIciAL ADMnOISTR&TION 146-
205 (1949).
18 J. FRANxi, supra note 11.
19 For a reasonably complete bibliography compiled by Professo' Dale Broeder
for the Chicago Jury Project, see Hearing Before the Subcomm. to Investigate
the Administration of the Internal Security of the Ser.ate Comm. on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-81 (1955).20H. KALVEN ANi H. ZmzEL, Tim AimcawCA JuRy (1966); H. K..vN
ANm H. 7Z--ZL, DELAY iN THE COURT (1959).21H. K1ALvE Am H. ZmaE, THE AmzIwcA JURY vi (1966).
KENTuCKY LAw JouRNAL
The other major effort published to date deals not with the jury
per se, but with human perception as it relates to the individual's
ability to judge objective facts. The effort has been directed at
lawyers and the judicial structure to illustrate what experimental psy-
chologists have known for some time: what people perceive, and what
is transmitted to them are not necessarily the same.22 While this is use-
ful in terms of cross-examining a witness for impeachment, one must
not overlook the fact that what we have in a jury trial is a person,
i.e., a witness, who attempts to communicate his imperfect perceptions
to other individuals, i.e., jurors, who in turn alter the perceptions which
have been related to them. This is not to say that there is a conscious
effort on the part of the witness or the jurors to change "the facts," but,
rather, that these individuals qua individuals respond to unconscious
selectivity and coloration. Likewise, this is not to imply that the jury
structure is inherently "wrong," but merely to suggest that one should
not be over simplistic in an analysis of the jury system, as earlier
indicated by the leaders of the Chicago Jury Project.23
II. THE RIGHT To AN IPARTIAL JURY
In the past fifty years, the legal community, as well as the American
society, has been confronted with what should have become common-
place: the guarantees for the preservation of the right to a trial by
jury, as written into the United States Constitution,24 as well as most
state constitutions. 2 These guarantees mean something more than
merely having a group of individuals listen to arguments. Whether
the complaint is of a civil or criminal nature, the individual is en-
titled to an "impartial jury;" and while it would appear that such a
standard would lend itself readily to application, this simple phrase
has been overlooked or distorted to suit the needs of those who seek
merely to protect their own immediate interests.
The appellate courts have been forced to look at this situation,
and establish standards in addition to, or at least augmenting, the
concept of an impartial jury. Some courts have merely stated that a
trial by jury, any member of which is biased or prejudiced, is not a
constitutional jury.26 Others have attempted to clarify the word
"impartial," by suggesting that it means not partial, not favoring one
22J. MAmnsALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT (1966).2 3 H. KALvN AND H. ZERZ-L, supra note 21, at 492-99.
24 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI and VII.2 5 See, e.g., Ky. CoNsT. § 7 (1942).2 6 Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Cushman, 22 Wash. 2d 930, 158 P.2ad
101 (1945); Brown v. State, 289 S.W. 392 (Tex. Czim. App. 1926).
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party more than another, unprejudiced, disinterested, equitable, and
just .2 7 It should be obvious that those who would so clarify one term
with another which is as nebulous have accomplished nothing, and
thus little is gained from the definition. In an attempt to be more
realistic about this matter, it has been suggested that bias or pre-
judice may arise from a variety of causes and depends so much on the
facts and circumstances of the particular case that no definition or
rule can be conclusive,28 but the true inquiry in all cases is whether
the juror will act with entire impartiality.29 This proposition, while
correcting some of the errors of the over-simplified conceptualization
of the matter, however, ultimately reverts back to the same basic error
of definitions.
Thus, while the courts and judicial advisors, i.e., the attorneys, are
unable to articulate what it is they mean, only a rough attempt has
been made to expunge certain persons from the jury because of their
bias or prejudice.30 In the case of racial prejudice, the courts have
indicated that a juror is incompetent if he is so prejudiced against the
litigant's race or nationality that he cannot, for this reason, give the
litigant a fair and impartial trial.31 If the courts could stop at this
point, there would appear to be an adequate basis for challenging the
prospective jurors. However, the courts have held that where the
juror merely has a general, unfavorable opinion of the litigant's race,
which he, the juror, can swear will in no way influence his verdict,
there is no basis for dismissal for cause.82 The same general standard
has been applied to the cases in which there is prejudice against a
particular class of actions,3 3 and where there is prejudice against a
particular defense.34 While one might abstract the human mind to
have this general standard work in theory, it should be clear that
what a person will swear to in regard to his bias or prejudice is as
much a reflection of his willingness to admit the bias as it is a
reflection of the attitude itself. Thus, while two persons may have the
same degree of prejudice, one may swear the prejudice will not affect
his decision, and will be included, while the other cannot, and will be
excluded. It might be suggested that under these circumstances both
27Barker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1942); Stockton v. State,
187 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1945); Burge v. State, 35 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1931).28 Ray v. People, 63 Col. 376, 167 P. 954 (1917).29 Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Crane, 175 Okla. 1198, 51 P.2d 711 (1935).
30 United States v. Smith, 200 F. Supp. 885 (D. Vt. 1962).
31 State v. Russell, 47 Nev. 263, 220 P. 552 (1923).
82 Id.
83 Ruschenberg v. Southern Elec. By., 161 Mo. 70, 61 S.W. 626 (1900).84 Crain v. State, 394 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
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litigants would be better served by the individual who is willing to
admit his bias.
The judicial system has now begun to understand that these pre-
viously established standards appear inadequate, and has begun to
follow the advice of the sociologists who have suggested that a better
criteria for an impartial jury would relate to a consideration of the
ethnic groups represented."5 Thus, where, in a criminal case, the
defendant is a Mexican, the jury should have some members of the
Mexican population present. The same would be true for Indians,
Negroes, and other minority groups,8 and presumably would be the
case in civil as well as criminal litigation.3 7 However, as we shall see,
even this improvement of the ethnic-group classifications must give
way to an understanding of the individual, within and without his
"group.:
III. JuREms As PsYcaoLoGicAL UNITs
The problem before us is to realize the implications of placing
several individuals in a jury box with instructions that they should
listen to the evidence presented to them, and render a judgment as to
the "facts." We must not overlook the significance of having formed
an artifical group8 8 which must act, in some sense, as an entity or unit.
While each person may be a psychological unit, when placed in a
group these individual units tend to merge or conform. At this point
we are ready to turn to the area of social psychology for assistance in
understanding the effects of the larger unit on the individual.
In a series of studies to ascertain the power of group pressure to
induce conformity of judgment in the individual, S. E. Asch placed a
"naive" subject into a pre-formed group. Unknown to this individual,
the experimenter had already made arrangements for the remainder
of the group to respond erroneously as he directed. When the new
subject was admitted to the group, he was instructed that the
purpose of the group was to make certain comparative judgments as
to the lengths of various lines. The one naive subject was placed near
the end of the row so that his judgment would be given only after the
majority had given theirs. Thus, this individual found himself in a
85 See, Constitutional Rights in Jury Selection, TmAX-, Feb.-Mar. 1967, at 4,
col. 2.86 Hernandez v. Texas, 847 U.S. 475 (1954).
37 Butler v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways, 887 S.W.2d 867 (Ky.
1965).
8 As this term is used, it is designed to draw a distinction between groups
which form out of natural selection, e.g., a lunch group, which may differ from
experimental study groups or juries.
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situation where his correct judgment, on critical trials, would be in
opposition to those given by a unanimous majority.39
During his first experiments, Asch found that of the 123 naive
subjects who were tested on twelve critical judgments, 37 per cent
of the total number of judgments were in error, i.e., the judgments
were in conformity with those of the unanimous majority. This result
is contrasted with the control subjects, i.e., those not subjected to the
erroneous group pressure, vho, judging alone, made virtually no
errors. ° It should be understood that significant individual differences
in responses to this group pressure were found, ranging from complete
independence of the majority by some to complete yielding on all
critical trials by others.41
In another series of studies conducted by R. S. Crutchfield, the
same general format was followed, except that the group pressure was
not a face-to-face group, but a bogus "group" which was in fact the
experimenter's control. This experimenter found that substantial
amounts of yielding were produced by the group pressure, and the
consensus would prevail even though it was manifestly wrong.4 In
one such series, the subjects were asked to make perceptual judgments
about two figures, a star and a circle placed adjacent to one another.
When the two figures were so placed, with the circle being one-third
larger in area, the subjects were asked to indicate which of the two
had the larger area. In a sample of military officers, 46 per cent
agreed with the bogus group consensus that the star was the larger.43
To point out the extent to which one will conform, and the
ultimate absurd results, R. D. Tuddenham employed the Crutchfield
experimental design of the bogus group on a sample of college students.
In this series, if the individual agreed with al of the group judgments,
he would have depicted the United States in the following grotesque
manner:
The United States is largely populated by old people, 60 to 70 per cent
being over 65 years of age. These oldsters must be almost all women,
since male babies have a life expectancy of only 25 years. Though out-
lived by women, men tower over them in height, being eight or nine
inches taller, on the average. The society is obviously preoccupied with
eating, averaging six meals per day, this perhaps accounting for their
agreement with the assertion, "I never seem to get hungry." Americans
waste little time on sleep, averaging only four or five hours a night,
39 Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of
judgment, Gnours, LP~ADEsmp, AND MENr (H. Guetzkow ed. 1951).40 Id.4 1 D. YKnxcH, R. CRuTcHEEmL, & E. BALLAc=, IDrvmuA IN SocEry 508
(1962) [hereinafter cited as KREci, C=TrcHLam & BALI.ACHEY].42 Crutchfield, Conformity and Character, 10 AMMa PsYCHOL. 191-98 (1955).
43 KREcH, CRuTcHFm D & BAL.L_.cHEv 509.
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a pattern perhaps not unrelated to the statement that the average
family includes five or six children. Nevertheless, there is no over-
population problem, since the USA stretches 6,000 miles from San
Franciso to New York. Although the economy is booming with an average
wage of $5.00 per hour, rather negative and dysphoric attitudes charac-
terize the group, as expressed in their soundly rejecting the proposition,
"Any man who is able and willing to work hard has a good chance of
succeeding," and in agreeing with such statements as, "Most people would
be better off if they never went to school at all," "There's no use in doing
things for people; they don't appreciate it," and "I cannot do anything
well."44
Such is the weird but wonderful picture of the world of the yielder.45
This is not to suggest that all persons in a jury trial would respond
as did the subjects in the experiments, but merely to say that some
individuals will yield to massive group pressure. As a corollary to this
proposition is the observation that some individuals will never yield
to the group, while still others will yield, but only under certain cir-
cumstances. It is essential that we never fall into the error of be-
lieving that the group is the smallest unit, as each individual is po-
tentially capable of changing the appearance and overt response of
that larger unit. This seems to have been realized by the appellate
courts in their insistence that a jury not be representative of a mono-
lithic ethnic group.46 Unfortunately, the courts have failed to look be-
yond the facade of this type classification system to note that just as
ethnic groups differ from one another, so do the members of an ethnic
group differ from one another. This form of classification, while it
alters the structure, suffers the same weakness as the unaltered struc-
ture, i.e., the individual has been overlooked for the benefit of the
group classification.
Once we find our way back to the ephemeral "individual," we must
realize that although we cannot explain the basic "Why" of his conduct,
we can observe his overt behavior and make some predictions as to
what his conduct will be in the future. For our purposes, the funda-
mental concern is with the individual's attitudes as they affect what
he perceives, infra, and with his perceptions as they, in turn, affect
what he does. In our contemporary world of communication, transpor-
tation, and computer technology, survival will increasingly depend on
the interaction of various groups and their sub-groups. In a very
practical way it does matter how these groups conceive their mode of
life as well as their perception of others', their ways of doing things and
44 Tuddenham and Macbride, The Yielding Experiment From the Subjects
Point of View, 27 J. P ans. 259, 260 (1959).4 5 Y.BECH, CBUTCHFIELD & BALLACHEY 513.46 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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otherd ways, their attitude on various aspects of life and other'
attitudes.' 7
Without attempting to discover where the person acquires an
attitude, we must start by assuming that an attitude refers to a stand
or position the individual will take which upholds and cherishes certain
objects, issues, persons, groups, or institutions. "The referents of a
person's attitudes may be a 'way of life'; economic, political or religious
institutions; family, school, or government."48 Having reached this
juncture, we may say that this person is no longer neutral toward the
referents of the attitude. He may experience feelings of being for or
against, positively inclined or negatively disposed to some objects. This
thing, i.e., the attitude, is not a momentary aspect of his personality,
but is of lasting quality so long as the attitude is operative.49
While it should be apparent that any such strong attitude will
affect the individual's megalo-response, what may be more important
is how weaker attitudes affect the micro-response. If we conceptualize
a particular response, e.g., an overt action, as being the function of the
particular stimulus, we have indulged in an over-simplification of the
human organism. A more exact model of behavior would be represented
by the formula,
R==f(O, Si, S2, ..
where R represents a particular response, 0 is the organism with its
present attitudes and experiences, and S1, S2, . . . represent all the
stimuli which make up the universe of stimuli." Under laboratory
conditions, this model appears to hold true for simple studies of at-
tention. To our detriment, however, a juror's experiences in the court
room or in life are not so limited. While an experimenter may control
the number of stimuli being transmitted to a subject, and likewise
control to an extent the number of possible responses, in the real
world the laboratory formula must be rewritten to provide for a
number of stimuli, personal factors and responses. When this is done,
we must provide for at least a finite number (n) of possibilities, and
the formula appears as
RB=f(On, Sn).
This is done so that we may now understand the role of On, and attempt
to ascertain why it is that the person responded to a particular situa-
47 C. SIMRau, M. SHERu, & R. NEBERGAL, ATrrruDE AND ATI-rUm. CHANGE1 (1965).
48 Id. at 4.
49 Id. at 5.




tion in a particular way. Simply stated, this means that while the
individual is a compact unit, there are any number of possible psycho-
logical sets which might be considered if we were to determine what
inter-relation exists between the various stimuli and the ultimate
responses. At this point, we can then add to the model the axiom that
what a person has previously experienced affects his present perception
or attention.5'
From this rather complicated model, we ultimately come to what
is known, almost as common sense, that a person may be subjected to
a number of facts and opinions, but based on what he has previously
experienced, he will respond in different ways. It is essentially from
this understanding that the Jury Project analyzed the effects of various
occupations on a verdict or decision in civil and criminal cases. The
same thing is done by every small-town lawyer who questions and
challenges prospective jurors, not necessarily because of a known
provable bias or prejudice, but because of an intuitive feeling based
on the attorney's personal experience with that individual. Where it
is not practical for the lawyer to know the prospective jurors, as where
a lawyer from another community is brought into a "foreign area," this
attorney is well advised to seek the assistance of co-counsel from the
local bar. In yet another situation, i.e., the large metropolitan areas,
an attempt has been made by the courts and private enterprise to
secure information about the individuals' names, addresses, and
occupations prior to trial, and make it available to the attorneys.52
In the only case which has questioned the use of these materials, the
court indicated that so long as both attorneys had access to the
information there is no objection.58
While such information as the individual's name, address, occupa-
tion, education, and knowledge of basic legal concepts, may be useful,
it is now time that we investigate the possibility of securing informa-
tion about the individual's personality which distinguishes him from
others who might live in the same area, have the same educational
background, a similar occupation, and the same awareness of legal
concepts. At this point, we can only turn to psychological testing for
assistance.54 From the information we obtain from this source, we
would be in a position not only to better equip the combatting at-
torneys with information about the individual jurors and how they
might react to a particular witness or statement, but the attorneys
would have a basis for understanding how the jury will respond. Like-
51 j. HoCHBEnG, PEncEmoN 34 (1965).
52 See Note, Jury Selection in California, 5 STAN. L. R1Ev. 247 (1953).
53 Baugh v. Beatty, 91 Cal. App. 2d 786, 205 P.2d 671 (1949).
54 See A. OsBoRN, supra note 10, at 87-107.
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wise, the courts would be better able to dismiss persons who are
obviously incompetent because of their bias. Before our judicial
system adopts such a program, however, it will need to know what
kinds of information are available, how it is obtained, and the limita-
tions of psychological testing in general.
IV. INTRODUCnON TO PSYCHOIOICAC TEsTMG
In the last decade the American society, and to a lesser extent, the
British and European societies, have been confronted with a myriad
of tests to diagnose, treat, and assist in solving the individual's most
complex personal problems. This phenomenon is the result of the
efforts of the philosophical psychologist of the latter half of the
nineteenth century who speculated and theorized that people were
different. The need for precise techniques to assess mental differences
between individuals was explicitly recognized by Sir Francis Galton,
whose efforts established the framework for the establishment of
psychological testing on a genuinely scientific basis.5  The concept of
measurable individual differences, coupled with the rise of experi-
mental psychology, resulted in the inevitable conclusion that each per-
son is in some way unique, but likewise similar to others of his
culture. Persons such as E. H. Weber, G. Fechner, Wilhelm Wundt,
and J. M. Cattell, gave psychology an empirical basis from which it
was possible to say all persons are in fact different in their abilities.56
While working with the available materials on individuals' abilities
to discriminate and judge tactile, visual, auditory and muscular stimuli,
the early psychologist created a "mental test" for his particular study.
With additional experimentation and reflection, it was thought that
just as there were distinct differences in individuals' abilities to dis-
criminate simple stimuli, so these individuals were probably different
in other respects, e.g., intelligence. This theme was picked up, ampli-
fied, and modified by such men as Alfred Binet, E. L. Thorndike, and
Lewis Terman. 7 As a result of the efforts of these and others, there
now appears to be no limit to the number of different intelligence tests
available for the use of educators to study pre-school-aged children as
well as the most advanced graduate students in universities. 8
Since it was apparent that the experimental and educational psy-
chologists could use their particular kinds of tests, the clinical psy-
55F. GALTON, INQunwEs INTO HuMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEvEaoPimNT
(1883).56 N. MUNN, PSYCHOLOGY 4-9 (4th ed. 1961).
57 Id. at 109-50.58 See THE FouRTH MENTAL MEsu Yrumoox (O.K. Buros ed. 1953).
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chologists, in conjunction with members of the medical profession who
called themselves psychoanalyists or psychiatrists-depending on the
extent to which they followed the teachings of Sigmund Freud-con-
sidered the possibility of using some test to assess or "measure" a
person's personality and his problems of adjustment. Just as with the
earlier intelligence tests, the new personality tests lacked much in em-
pirical norms and standards, but the shortage was quickly overcome by
the development and wide use of several different personality tests or
inventories.5 9 While there has been criticism concerning the proper and
improper use of the various tests, our educational institutions, mental
health personnel, and business interests-private and governmental-
continue to use the available tests to their advantage.6 0 Although the
use of these tests is widespread, it is of interest to note that they are
not being employed within the legal structure. It is for this reason
that the following material has been collected and systematized. We
shall look at the general problem and procedure of test construction,
the types of tests available, criticisms of the testing movement, usage
of the tests within the confines of the jury system, and limitations
which should be placed on the use of these tests.
V. CoNsmucaco OF TEsTs
Before any test can be created and used effectively, the tester must
decide what he hopes to quantify or measure. If, for example, one
wishes to determine how well a person comprehends what he reads, he
probably would not create questions which deal exclusively with
numbers. Conversely, a test of mathematical ability would not place
emphasis on the person's ability to read abstract material not con-
taining numbers. Just as each of the above examples requires the
tester to determine what he wishes to measure, so the creator or
author of a psychological test must specify what he wishes to quantify.
Thus, while one would generally think that a test of intelligence would
lend itself readily to any type of question, a useful and accurate test
requires an analysis of what is called intelligence and the factors to be
included in a generally accepted definition of this abstract.
For the psychologist concerned with drafting a personality in-
ventory, the analysis must begin with a concept of a model of be-
havior or a theory of personality. If one cannot determine how to
59 As of 1962, there were no less than five hundred personality tests and
inventories, with prospects for even more in the following decade. W. FrRmiAN,
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTmG 555 (Sd ed. 1962).
60 A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGCAL TESTING 4 (2d ed. 1961).
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conceptualize behavior, it is useless to devise questions and evaluate
the effectiveness of the questions. The psychologist is fortunate, how-
ever, as there are many academically accepted theories of personality
from which to choose,61 and while one may think in terms of a specific
approach, some overlap appears inevitable.6 2 It should be obvious that
a psychologist should not begin the actual construction of a test until
he has decided on his particular model of human behavior. From here
the psychologist may then draft questions with reference to his parti-
cular model which will ultimately measure or quantify attitudes,
personality factors, or performance. Once the question is drafted, it
must be submitted to a sample of the population to empirically validate
the accuracy of the question.63 If, for example, the questions are
designed to quantify racial prejudice, but when submitted to persons
known to have the particular prejudice, the test results fail to identify
the factor, the questions must be discarded or modified. It is at this
point that the author of the test must face the questions of reliability
and validity of his test.
Reliability for the tester is the consistency of the measure through-
out a series of tests,64 and indicates how much confidence may be
placed in the measure. To ascertain this information, the author may
use one of two methods, the test-retest or the split-halves.65 The test-
retest method, by far the simpler, requires the same test or series of
questions to be asked a second time of the same person or group
after a lapse of time. If the same results are obtained each time, the
test is said to be reliable. On the other hand, if the split-halves
method is used, the test is divided into two equal halves and given to
the persons to be tested. If the questions are valid and quantify the
same thing, the results of a reliable test would find substantially the
same results for each half.66 It must be remembered, however, that
reliability, which may be conceptualized as separate from validity, is
inseparably linked to the latter.
The concept of validity looks to the issue of whether the question
or test does in fact quantify what it seeks to ascertain.67 If the
psychologist is concerned with the construct validity of the inventory,
61 See genera!h C. HALL -AN G. LmuZEy, THxouEs or PEsoNArrr (1957).
62 Id.
6SL. CRONBACH, EssENmixs or PsYcHoLOc=A ThsrTNc 122 (2d ed.
1960).6" d. at 126.
65 Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.6 7 Cattell, Foundations of Personality Measurement Theory in Multivariate
Experiments, OBECravE APPRoAcHEs TO PERsoNALr AssEssmr 52 (B. Bass
and I. Berg eds. 1958).
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he is asking whether the test or question relates to his previously
indicated model of behavior or personality theory.6 On the other hand,
if one is concerned with the issue of concurrent validity, statistical
analysis must be conducted to determine whether the new series of
questions quantifies the behavior as well as previously established
tests.6 9 Again there is considerable overlap of these two kinds of
validity, but they may be conceptualized for the purpose of analysis.
At the same time, it must be realized that the question of con-
struct validity may not be postponed until the questions are formulated.
The process of drafting the questions involves a continuous analysis
of how well the question delineates the underlying behavior. With
this consideration, the tester must also evaluate the nature and quality
of his proposed question with reference to other inventories which
have proven themselves useful. Likewise, the tester scrutinizes each
proposed question to estimate how reliable it will ultimately prove to
be.
Once the tester is satisfied that his test is reliable and valid, by
testing for both construct and concurrent validity, the decision re-
mains as to whether it is a good test. Conceivably any test which
arrives at this point might be given the desired label. However, it
should be clear that a test which has met the preliminary require-
ments and is simple to administer is a better test than one which pro-
duces valid results but is awkward and time-consuming. to administer.
While substantial consideration must be given to the efforts required
of one who administers the inventory, the ultimate purpose of any
test will be to establish norms for the population by which individuals
may be compared to one another. Thus, a test which is easier to ad-
minister will lend itself to this purpose.70
If a new test survives the procedure described, it remains to be
selected and used by various individuals for their particular purposes.
While it might appear to be a simple task to make the selection, the
need for a qualified psychologist is present in each of the three major
aspects of the testing situation: selection, administration and scoring,
and interpretation.71
68 L. CRONBACE, supra note 63, at 105.
69 Id. at 104.
70 Id. at 147-56.
71 The test may not be evaluated by name, author or other easy marks of
identification. Although it requires no psychological expertise to consider such
factors as cost, bulkiness, ease of transportation, and testing time required, such
is needed to evaluate the technical merits of the test in terms of validity, reliability
and norms. A. ANASTASI, supra note 60, at 47.
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With this understanding of the construction, it is useful to now
look at particular personality tests which are commonly used. Prob-
ably the best known, and one of the most thorough personality in-
ventories is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (herein-
after referred to as the MMPI), first published in 1943 by S. R. Hatha-
way and J. C. McKinley. The inventory consists of 550 true-false
questions, many of which were borrowed from earlier tests of per-
sonality; but other original items more pertinent to the areas typically
examined by a thorough diagnostic interview in a psychiatric setting
are also found. In all, the inventory covers questions from twenty-six
categories, which are broken down into thirteen scores. 72
The thirteen scores are plotted on a profile sheet that provides an
automatic conversion of the raw score data to standard scores. 73 Pri-
mary significance is attached to scores in excess of 70 (60 being the
average for the reference group), but as the cut-off is somewhat
arbitrary, interpreters examine all peaks whether or not they cross the
threshold.7 4 The profile for the MMPI thus lends itself to complex
configural interpretations. A significant limitation on the use of the
MMPI arises out of the fact that it is primarily oriented toward matters
of psychopathology and morbidity with its greatest validity being
shown when applied to clinical and psychiatric problems, showing less
utility in problems of normal behavior and everyday life.75
Examples of personality inventories more directly related to the
functioning of normal individuals, thus compensating for the short-
coming of the MMPI, are the California Psychological Inventory
(hereinafter referred to as the CPI), the California Test of Personality
(hereinafter referred to as the CTP), the Minnesota Counseling In-
ventory (hereinafter referred to as the MCI), and the Sixteen Per-
sonality Factor Questionnaire (hereinafter referred to as the 16PFQ).
The CPI, CTP, and the MCI are modeled from the MMPI, but are
specifically designed for relatively normal high-school students, adults,
and college students, respectively, while the 16PFQ originates from an
independent source.
The CPI, the results of the efforts of H. G. Cough, first published in
1957 for high-school students, is a lengthy inventory covering fifteen
72 G. DArrsTom & S. WELCH, AN MMI HANDBOOx 48-85. (1965).
73 A standard score is a statistical term used to identify a raw score in its
relation to the mean, i.e., the arithmetical average.
74 L. CRONBACH, supra note 63, at 471.
75 Id. at 481-84.
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traits such as sociability, tolerance, and intellectual effiLiency, plus
three control keys. The scoring keys were developed empirically, but
certain of the scales have a low correlation with their criteria; i.e., the
concurrent validity is not as accurate as the MMPI. Interpretation is
based primarily on an impressionistic psychological integration of the
entire profile and while this test covers a broader range of behavior,
the greatest criticism is the lack of well established norms.71
The CTP, the work of L. P. Thorpe, first published in 1953 for the
public school system and adults, contains questions which yield per-
centile scores on personal adjustment and social adjustment. Such
subscores as "sense of personal worth," "nervous symptoms," and
"family relations" have skewed distributions, i.e., the distribution does
not conform to the normal bell-shaped curve, and is capable of giving
meaningful information about patterns of adjustment only in rare
cases. These scales are contrasted with others which have proven more
useful
7 7
The third inventory, the MCI, the product of R. F. Berdie and
W. L. Layton, is likewise for pre-adults. Most of the 418 true-false self-
descriptive statements are rewritten MMPI items. Seven scales measure
adjustment of such things as family and social relations, emotional
stability, mood, and conformity. There are two control scales com-
parable to the first four scales on the MMPI. The scales have positive
but very modest validity for separating, for example, pupils known to
have poor family adjustment from those rated as having good ad-
justment, while the reliabilty appears to be more than adequate. How-
ever, this inventory, like so many others, comes up short for want of
adequate norms.78
It should be apparent at this point that the most useful of the
preceeding inventories is the MMPI. This is not to say, however, that
the criticisms raised in the discussion of the other three inventories
should render them totally useless. To the contrary, the CPI, CTP, and
MCI are all useful for particular purposes. The key to this utility
does not rest in the test alone, but in the skill and knowledge of the
administrator as indicated supra.79 The deficiencies which do exist, in
addition, may be overcome with a concerted effort and analysis of
the construction process.
A fourth inventory which should not go unmentioned is the 16PFQ,
first published in 1956, by R. B. Cattell, D. R. Saunders, and G. Stice.
This inventory, like the two proceeding ones, is designed to be used on
76 Id. at 495.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 496.
79 A sT~s,r supra note 60, at 47.
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normal individuals from sixteen years of age through adulthood. In his
analysis and evaluation of this inventory, C. I. Adcock has suggested
that this particular test is a major step forward in the area of psy-
chological testing, since it is originally based on a comprehensive
factor analysis, and a prodigious amount of statistical analysis has
gone into it. As an indication of this tests acceptance, it is of interest
that between its initial publication and 1959, the test had been trans-
lated into six foreign languages for use outside the English speaking
world.80
VII. CR CISxis OF TESTInG
Up to this point, we have concerned ourselves with the history and
construction of personality inventories with no consideration being
given to the ramifications of the entire testing movement referred to
in the introductory sentences. The problem now is to look at the in-
ventions of the human mind to determine the If, When, and How.
Most psychologists involved in the area of testing will readily agree
that the elements of reliability, validity and suitable norms in the
present tests could be vastly improved.81 These considerations, how-
ever, should not be the basis for abandoning the testing movement.
Likewise, the inadequacies of certain tests should not vitiate otherwise
useful inventories. The problems which we must face are of a more
subtle nature.
It was Mr. Justice Brandeis who prophesied the very kind of prob-
lem which now confronts us. Referring to "subtler and more far reach-
ing means of invading privacy," Justice Brandeis predicted that
"advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of
exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts, and emotions" 82 "Can it be,"
he asked, "that the Constitution affords no protection against such in-
vasions of individual security?"83
To this question he answered:
The makers of our Constitution . . . recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his failing, and of his intellect.... They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions,
8 0 THE FIFrH MrrAL MAsunmxmrN YE ,BooK 196 (O.K. Buros ed. 1959).
The scales for the test are as follows: (1) aloof v. warm-outgoing; (2) dull v.
bright; (3) emotional v. mature; (4) submission v. dominant; (5) glum-silent v.
enthusiastic; (6) casual v. conscientious; (7) timid v. adventurous; (8) tough v.
sensitive; (9) trustful v. suspecting; (10) conventional v. eccentric; (11) simple v.
sophisticated; (12) confident v. insecure; (13) conservative v. experimenting;
(14) dependent v. self-sufficient; (15) lax v. controlled; (16) stable v. tense; and
17) a control scale.
81 Id. at 196-98.82 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
83 Id. at 474.
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and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the
right to be let alone-the most valued by civilized men. To protect that
right, every individual unjustifiable instrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed must be
deemed a violation of the fourth amendment.84
Clearly Mr. Justice Brandeis' words may not be taken to mean that
psychological testing is unconstitutional, but the inference is raised
that if the government should undertake such a course of action,
serious constitutional questions would arise. This was significantly
pointed out a few years ago when the Supreme Court was asked to
decide whether a particular psychological test might be required as
a condition of governmental employment.85 The Court said the
numerous questions asked in the test regarding religious beliefs and
practices violated the first as well as the fourth amendment. It went
further to say the government cannot, as a condition of employment,
inquire into such matters.8 6 One might argue then that a person who
is required to take a personality test or inventory, for any governmental
purpose, is encouraged to "fake" the examination, or expose to the
government that which the fourth and fifth amendments protect.
While some would argue that the protection of the fourth amend-
ment extends only to unreasonable searches and seizures, it may well
be that the Supreme Court has clearly indicated an inclination to ex-
pand the protections of the fourth amendment in the direction of that
suggested by Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and Butler. 7 Thus it
has been suggested that an analogy may not be drawn between a
physical and a psychological examination. As Monroe H. Freedman,
Associate Professor of Law at George Washington University, indicated
before a Senate hearing: "There is nothing unconstitutional about
taking finger prints. It may well be unconstitutional to subject him
to certain kinds of [psychological] questioning" 88
In a recent study sponsored by the Special Committee of Science
and Law of the New York City Bar Association, Professor Alan F.
Westin of Columbia University investigated three areas of scientific
technology and their possible legal implications. Professor Westin,
after examining the mushrooming technology of surveillance, via wire-
tapping, personality testing, and central data collecting, issued a blunt
warning: A broad range of legislative, judicial, executive, and private
84 Id. at 478.85 Torcaso v. Watkdns, 67 U.S. 488 (1961).
s Ild.
87 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).88 Hearings on Psychological Tests and Constitutional Rights Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Cumn. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1965).
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actions are needed now if the American Society is to protect privacy
from the increasing pressures of scientific technology. We have only a
few years of lead time left before the problem will outgrow our
capacity to apply controls. 89 Dealing specifically with personality tests,
Professor Westin indicated that the personality inventories which are
now widely used by the government and industry go beyond the
measurement of intelligence, skills, and attitudes to probe emotional
states, chaaracter traits, social, religious, and political attitudes, and
sexual adjustment.90 Professor Westin perceives this type questioning as
a definite invasion of privacy, even though in his study of 208
nationally known corporations, 47 percent were using various per-
sonality inventories: of those corporations not using the inventories,
more than half believed that such tests did not invade privacy.91
Clearly the private sector of the population has not considered the
overall implications of its activity. For the companies using the psy-
chological tests, and those which believed there was no invasion of
privacy, the personality tests were seen as merely effective and efficient
means of personnel selection. Westin, however, indicates that the use
of psychological inventories is not the evil in and of itself, but that
these tests must be viewed in a total picture.
Specifically, Westin is concerned with the move toward data
surveillance. The report of the study indicates that the trend toward
greatly increased collection of personnel data, exchange of informa-
tion among the collectors, and consolidation of such personal in-
formation into central data banks represents by far the most serious
threat to privacy in the coming decade.92 This movement has already
begun, for today we find an individual pouring a stream of personal
data about himself into files from birth onward, and it is information
which is becoming more and more available for public use.93
Professor Westin predicts that the next decade will see the growth
of computerized central data banks containing enormous amounts of
personal information such as birth and marriage records, school re-
cords, passport data, credit ratings, job experience, military records,
medical and psychiatric reports, income and social security returns,
ad infinitum. With the new laser-recording process, it is possible to
put tventy pages of typed information about every man, woman, and
s9 A. WEsTn, PRIvAcY AND FmmoEm 365-99 (1967).90 Id. at 183-57.
91 Id. at 136.
92 Id. at 158-68.93 Miller, The National Data Center and Personal Privacy. 20 Tir ArLArc,
November 1967, at 53-57.
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child in the United States on a single 4,800 foot reel of plastic
computer tape. This tape may be easily stored and available for swift
recall by any party having access to the tape.94
The question now is: What do we want to pay for progress?95
Our society, for the most part, is based on a philosophy of work and
education. Private enterprise is concerned with finding new and
better ways of providing products and services. Most of this effort has
resulted in advantages for the entire society.
Without attempting to evaluate the relative merits and demerits
in terms of present and future advantages versus disadvantages, some
framework must now be established whereby technology may con-
tinue while placing sufficient restraints on this progress to enable a
thorough analysis and reflection to ascertain the relative merits.
Specifically, we must look to psychology and psychological testing to
assist us in finding better ways for individuals to maximize their
personal potential, while restraining the movement which could
ultimately destroy the very individualism it is designed to enhance. For
example, it has been held that certain types of personality inventories
may not be used as a requirement for* governmental employment, since
the questions on the test invade constitutionally protected zones. How-
ever, the psychologists responded to the criticism, and the limitation
was met with new tests which were 'culture free" to measure intel-
ligence without discrimination against minority groups.96 Realizing
this fact, Professor Westin, speaking before the American Psychological
Association convention in September, 1966, indicated that if this may
be done there is no reason why it should not be possible to give such
time and money as is necessary to develop a "privacy-respecting"
personality inventory.9 7 Thus, to the extent that the personality in-
ventories do invade the constitutional protection of the fourth and
fifth amendments, new tests may be required to overcome the objection.
However, the problems of the central data banks may not be so easily
solved, but a possible solution will be presented, infra, with specific
reference to the proposed uses of psychological tests for jury selection.
VIII. PRosPos L AND SAFEcAu S
Under our present system of jury selection, the trial judge is given
9 4 A. WEsTN, supra note 89, at 163-68.
95 For an entertaining satire of the problems which could be created by a
National Data Bank, see Elliott and Goulding, The Day the Computers




considerable latitude in which he may deny an attorney the privilege
of striking a particular juror for cause, if that juror will swear he can
decide the case without permitting his prejudice to affect his decision-
making processes. It should be clear from our earlier discussion that
this is impossible for any juror to do if he has any prejudice or bias,
but as the "law" provides it is possible, the trial judge may act
accordingly. The advantage of using psychological tests on pro-
spective jurors would be to have some quasi-scientific basis for under-
standing this thing we call a jury. If the tests were administered at
the beginning of the term for which the jurors were asked to serve,
the results could be compiled for all of these persons on the broadest
possible array of situations. By so doing, an attorney could consult with
the psychological experts to discover the nature of the person or
persons to whom he is to present his case. Likewise, the attorney would
not be placed in the awkward position of having to probe into the
personal background of each prospective juror before the courtroom
observers. This would benefit the court as it could speed cases on to
trial without lengthy voir dire examinations, and the attorney would
not be placed in a situation which antagonizes the jurors who remain
as well as those who are struck for cause or under the peremptory
challenge. In the event the court was unsure as to whether a particular
juror should be seated, the attorney could present his argument to the
court without an open confrontation with the court or the individual
jurors.
This procedure of psychological testing would not be used as a
conclusive basis for selecting the jury, but as an additional basis to
expedite the judicial proceeding. Likewise, such a procedure would
create substantive evidence which an attorney might use on appeal if
there was a clear abuse of .the trial judge's discretion in seating a
particular juror: the appellate court would have something other than
the mere dialogue of the courtroom on which to base its decision.
The obvious concern of appellate courts is to balance a litigant's
right to have an impartial jury against the individual juror's right of
privacy. As indicated earlier, if the tests are properly constructed
there should be no constitutional objection to the procedure, unless
there is an a prior assumption that any testing would be an invasion
of the individual's privacy. The obvious answer to this is that psycho-
logical tests are not essential to a trained individual to understand
others. As Freud once indicated:
He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no
mortal can keep a secret. If the lips are silent, he chatters with his finger
tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore.98
98 M S. FPxro, Co~ricxr PPEas 78 (1933).
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Why then should we use psychological tests? The answer lies in
expedience for the attorneys, the trial court, and the appellate courts
as the tests could quickly and inexpensively reveal what would other-
wise require several individual psychologists or psychiatrists to dis-
cover. However, before the courts begin using psychological tests in
jury selection, new tests must be devised which will better quantify
that which they seek to measure. Analysis of personality theories,
reliability, validity, and norms should be re-evaluated in addition to
accepting Professor Westin's proposal that the tests be designed to
be "privacy-respecting."
At the same time, emphasis should be placed on training lawyers
and judges to understand the construction, scoring, and interpreta-
tion of the personality inventories. This is not to say that either the
attorneys or the court should administer and interpret the test, but
merely that these individuals be made to understand what a psycho-
logist can and cannot say about human behavior. As indicated in the
section dealing with test construction, a trained psychologist is need-
ed to select, administer, evaluate, and interpret the scores. However,
under the present system, a psychologist may be able to do his part,
but for lack of understanding on the part of the legal system, the in-
formation cannot be used effectively.
The final requirement of this proposal is by no means the least
significant, but goes to the most urgent problem created by the use of
these or any other psychological tests. Professor Westin adequately
stated the problems created by the possibility of a National Data Bank;
the question now is to decide what to do about these "anks." It is sug-
gested that under the proposal for the administration of psychological
tests in the area of jury selection that the informational results of the
test be limited to the individual psychologist who administers the tests,
the judge, and the respective counsel. Once this is understood,
sanctions of the nature of criminal prosecution, civil suits, and pos-
sible contempt of court action should be made available to a party if
information of the results of his examination are made known to any
other person or agency. These limitations are essential at this point as
it is clear that we have reached a degree of sophistication in scientific
technology and understanding of the human mind that we can no
longer disregard the information which is available, but our human-
value system requires that we retain sufficient control over the creative
process so as to prevent its self-destruction.
C. David Emerson
